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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shane Roy Denton appeals his judgment of conviction upon a jury's guilty
verdict for attempted strangulation. Although he did not object at trial, Denton
argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument that
amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal.

However, Denton fails to

meet his burden of establishing the requisite elements for fundamental error.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Denton with felony attempted strangulation.

(R., pp.

65-66.) The victim is Denton's wife, Helena Denton, with whom he lived at the
time of the crime. (R., p. 66; Vol. II Tr., p. 5, L. 22 - p. 6, L. 8; p. 9, L. 25 - p. 10,

L. 6. 1 ) Helena testified at trial that she and Denton were having marital problems
and got into a verbal argument. (Vol. II Tr., p. 11, L. 11; p. 12, L. 22 - p. 15, L.
20.)

When Helena took a step away from Denton, he "grabbed [her] by the

throat." (Vol. II Tr., p. 16, L. 12 - p. 17, L. 7.) Denton, who is 6'2" and 210 lbs,
then picked up Helena, who was 94 lbs, and slammed her to the ground. (Vol. II
Tr., p. 19, Ls. 8-25.) At that time, Helena was about six weeks pregnant with
Denton's child. (Vol. II Tr., p. 7, Ls. 5-7; p. 88, Ls. 10-11.)
Helena's 16 year old son from a prior relationship arrived shortly after the
attempted strangulation. (Vol. II Tr., p. 29, Ls. 1-10.) Helena "was having really
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Consistent with Appellant's brief, this Respondent's brief shall cite to the
Transcript as follows: Vol. I - Voir Dire, Openings, Jury Instructions, Return of
Verdict; Vol. II - Trial, Closings.
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bad cramping, and ... still couldn't catch [her] breath," so her son helped her get
to the emergency room. (Vol. II Tr., p. 32, Ls. 10-25.)
At the hospital, Helena told the doctor she had been "assaulted by her
estranged spouse while at home." (Vol. II Tr., p. 83, Ls. 22-23.) She told the
doctor that Denton "grabbed [her] by the neck and lifted [her] up off the ground"
then threw her on her back and continued to strangle her. (Vol. II Tr., p. 83, L.
24 - p. 84, L. 2.)

Helena also told the doctor she "was having difficulty

swallowing and neck discomfort." (Vol. II Tr., p. 84, Ls. 8-9.) The doctor noted
"abrasions and bruising ... on the left side of [Helena's] neck." (Vol. II Tr., p. 87,
Ls. 2-3.) Helena declined a CT scan after the doctor discussed with her "the
risks of radiation exposure at that time in her pregnancy." (Vol. II Tr., p. 88, Ls.
5-6.)

A police officer who had interviewed Helena also testified at trial,

confirming Helena's report of Denton's attempt to strangle her. (Vol. II Tr., p.
135, L. 25- p. 136, L. 2.)

A jury found Denton guilty.

(R., p. 198.)

The district court sentenced

Denton to a unified term of eight years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 275-80.)
Denton timely appealed. (R., pp. 281-83.)
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ISSUE
Denton states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of
fundamental error by misstating the law, vouching for a witness,
and disparaging defense counsel.
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Denton failed to establish fundamental error as to his unpreserved claims of
prosecutorial misconduct?
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ARGUMENT
Denton Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error As To His Unpreserved
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Denton argues the prosecutor committed misconduct that infringed on his

right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 1.) Although the alleged misconduct was
not objected to at trial, Denton asserts it rose to the level of fundamental error
thus warranting reversal. (Id.) Applying Idaho case law to the record, Denton
fails to satisfy his burden on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly

improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 222-23, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 974-75, 980 (2010). For this, a defendant must
show error that (1) violates an unwaived constitutional right, (2) is clear or
obvious from the appellate record, (3) and that affected the outcome of
defendant's trial.

kt at 226,

245 P.3d at 978. "[P]rosecutorial misconduct during

closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so
egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments
should be disregarded." State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 170-71, 191 P.3d 244,
248-49 (Ct. App. 2008).
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C.

Denton Has Not Shown The Prosecutor Committed Error, Let Alone
Fundamental Error In Closing Argument
The purpose of closing argument is "to sharpen and clarify issues for

resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case." Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 862 (1975); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App.
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument.

2007).

State v.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). But a prosecutor may not "attempt[] to secure a
verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and
the evidence admitted during trial" and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
as doing so, "impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979.
Denton argues the prosecutor committed three instances of misconduct
during closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) As to each, Denton has
failed to meet his burden of showing the requisite elements under Perry are
satisfied.
1.

Denton Has Not Demonstrated Fundamental Error Through A
Misstatement Of Law By The Prosecutor During Closing

Denton asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttalclosing by misstating the law regarding the use of hearsay. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 6-8.) "It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in
closing arguments." Coffin, 146 Idaho at 170, 191 P.3d at 248 (citation omitted).
The prosecutor's disputed comments addressed defense counsel's closing

5

argument that Helena's statements to the emergency room physician and police
officer were inconsistent.
At trial, the emergency room physician and police officer, both of whom
spoke with Helena after the attempted strangulation, testified about hearsay
statements Helena made to them. (Vol. II Tr., p. 83, L. 4 - p. 84, L. 17; p. 138,
L. 14 - 139, L. 19.) The doctor's evaluation notes were admitted in evidence as

Defendant's Exhibit C, and the officer's Affidavit of Probable Cause was admitted
(as an exception to hearsay per Rule 803(8)(A)) as Defendant's Exhibit D. (Vol.
II Tr., p. 94, Ls. 10-16; p. 148, L. 14 - p. 151, L. 16.) Under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 806, when a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, "the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, ... [and] [e]vidence of a statement
or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with declarant's hearsay
statement, is not subject to any requirement that declarant may have been
afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." I.R.E. 806.
In rebuttal-closing, the prosecutor said:
[Defense Counsel] wants you to believe that there is [sic]
inconsistencies in Helena's story ... [he] had Helena on the stand,
didn't he?
But he never challenged Helena on [her story] ....
What does he do? He waits and gets Officer Gates on the
stand and says, Helena told you this and that's inconsistent, isn't
it?
(Vol. II Tr., p. 210, L. 13-p. 211, L. 2.) The prosecutor then argued:
You can't use double hearsay to prove somebody is
inconsistent. You have to ask the person who made the comment
and allow them to respond.
(Vol. II Tr., p. 211, L. 12.) Denton contends these comments misstated the law,
contrary to Rule 806.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.)
6

According to Denton, the

comments incorrectly instructed the jury that: (1) because the officer's testimony
was double hearsay, it could not be considered; and (2) to use Helena's hearsay
statements to demonstrate inconsistency, defense counsel was required to allow
Helena to respond.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.)

However, this argument

mischaracterizes the prosecutor's comments.
The disputed statements here were made as part of the prosecutor's
greater rebuttal-closing that argued to the jury what the evidence showed or did
not show.

(See Vol. II Tr., p. 208-17.)

The prosecutor's statements did not

instruct the jury about the law. Rather, the statements were rebuttal argument

that the evidence failed to demonstrate Helena's accounts of events were
inconsistent. "Prosecutors are entitled to ask jurors to draw inferences from the
trial evidence, including inferences about a witness's credibility."

State v.

Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _, 297 P.3d 257, 266 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations
omitted).
Even though defense counsel was not required by the rules to ask Helena
about the alleged inconsistencies in her statements, it was proper for the
prosecutor to point out that this inquiry did not happen. See State v. Dudley, 104
Idaho 849, 852, 664 P.2d 277, 280 (Ct. App. 1983) (proper to argue adverse
inference from failure to present particular admissible evidence).

Likewise, it

was proper to point out that the allegedly inconsistent statement was double
hearsay, thus the inconsistency might be attributable to the office rand not
Helena. The prosecutor's arguments were proper, and to any extent they might
be objectionable, do not rise to constitutional error.
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Because Denton failed to object at trial, he must show that prosecutorial
misconduct is "plain, clear, or obvious" from the record to satisfy the second
prong of the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, 381,
256 P.3d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 2011). Taken in context, it is far from plain, clear, or
obvious that the prosecutor's comments were intended, let alone interpreted, as
statements of law. It is therefore not plain, clear, or obvious that the prosecutor
committed misconduct.
Even if Denton could show clear misconduct, he cannot establish
fundamental error because he cannot demonstrate the third prong - that the
prosecutor's comments affected the outcome of his case. "We presume that the
jury followed the district court's instructions." State v. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766,
_, 316 P.3d 682, 692 (Ct. App. 2014). Here, the court instructed the jury as to
the law, including:
The evidence you are to consider consists of: sworn
testimony of witnesses; exhibits which have been admitted into
evidence; and any facts to which the parties have stipulated .
. . . The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in their
opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is
included to help you interpret the evidence but is not evidence.
(Vol. I, p. 168, L. 22 - p. 169, L. 7.) The court also instructed, "If anyone states a
rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my instruction that you must follow."
(Vol. I, p. 168, Ls. 15-17.)

Because we presume that the jury heeded these

instructions, Denton has failed to show the prosecutor's statements - allegedly
instructing the jury incorrectly as to the law - impacted the outcome of his case.
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Denton Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct By Vouching

2.

Denton argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for
testimony by the emergency room physician, Dr. Ellsworth.

(Appellant's brief,

pp. 9-10.) It is improper for a prosecutor to "vouch for a witness by placing the
prestige of the state behind the witness." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368,
233 P.3d 1286, 1290 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).

"Closing argument

should not include counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of
a witness."

ls!:.

at 369, 233 P.3d at 1291 (citations omitted). In this case, the

prosecutor did not offer a personal opinion or belief about the credibility of Dr.
Ellsworth, nor did he otherwise place the prestige of the state behind her.
In closing argument, the prosecutor said Dr. Ellsworth took notes of what
the victim (Helena) told her, then stated:
Why isn't that hearsay under Idaho law? Because it's believed that
any statements you make to a doctor are statements that you make
to tell them about your injuries.
(Vol. II Tr., p. 182, Ls. 6-8.) This is a correct statement of the law. I.RE. 803(4).
Denton does not argue otherwise.

Where a prosecutor makes "a correct

statement of law and ... factual reference ... grounded in the evidence," there
is no misconduct. Felder v. Dickhaut, 968 F.Supp.2d 334, 345 (D. Mass., 2013).
As already noted, "[p]rosecutors are entitled to ask jurors to draw inferences from
the

trial

evidence,

including

inferences

about

a

witness's

credibility."

Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at_, 297 P.3d at 266. Also, prosecutors may suggest
that the jury consider common sense in rendering credibility determinations.
Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 370, 233 P.3d at 1292.
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Even if Denton could establish the prosecutor committed plain, clear, or
obvious misconduct by vouching, to satisfy the second prong of a fundamental
error analysis, he cannot show the alleged vouching affected the outcome of his
trial. Again, we presume the jury follows the court's instructions regarding the
law. Iverson, 155 Idaho at_, 316 P.3d at 692. Here, the prosecutor correctly
articulated the exception to hearsay for statements made for purposes of
medical treatment. Any danger that the jury could have perceived the statement
as an instruction to "find Dr. Ellsworth's testimony credible ... as a matter of law"
(Appellant's brief, p. 10), was balanced by the court's instruction not to consider
the attorneys' arguments as evidence, and to follow the court's instructions
regarding the law. (See Vol. I, p. 168, L. 15 - p. 169, L. 7.) Accordingly, Denton
has failed to establish fundamental error by prosecutorial vouching.
3.

Denton Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct
Amounting To Fundamental Error By Disparagement Of Defense
Counsel

Finally, Denton contends the prosecutor improperly disparaged defense
counsel during closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) It is "misconduct
for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in closing
argument." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.3d 477,481 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003)). Also, it
is improper to disparage defense counsel by unfairly casting defense counsel's
role. State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657, 691 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct. App. 1984).
However, "[a] prosecutor has every legitimate right to point out weaknesses in a
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defendant's case," which "can be done in many ways without attacking the
defendant's counsel." l!;L
Denton challenges the prosecution's statements in closing:
[Defense counsel] never challenged Helena on any of those
[inconsistent statements]. He didn't pick it up and say, didn't you
say here in your statement da-da-da-da-da-da. He never asked
her because he didn't want her to say, that's not what I said.
What does he do? He waits and gets Officer Gates on the
stand and says, Helena told you this and that's inconsistent isn't
it? ...
. .. So if you can't point out discrepancies in somebody's
testimony to that person, let's use somebody else .
. . . You know, if you can't break your witness, if you can't
make them say something inconsistent, what do you do? You go
after law enforcement. So sure enough, let's go after Officer
Gates.
(Vol. II Tr., p. 210, L. 20- p. 211, L. 14; p. 212, Ls. 19-22; Appellant's brief, pp.
10-11.)

Comparing this case to Baruth, Denton contends "the prosecutor's

misconduct ... is clear from the record." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) It is not.
In Baruth, the prosecutor's disputed statements included casting defense
counsel as a "market[er]. .. , package[r] ... , and huckster" of "doubt." 107 Idaho at
657, 691 P.2d at 1272. In contrast, here, the prosecutor did not malign the role
of defense counsel.

Instead, he pointed out what defense counsel did, what

evidence defense counsel elicited, and what evidence counsel did not elicit from
Helena.

(Vol. II Tr., p. 210, L. 20 - p. 211, L. 9.)

The prosecutor's closing

focused on the evidence, not on counsel.
In Baruth, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's statements, and
the trial court "immediately issued corrective admonitions" which the appellate
court found appropriate.

Baruth, 107 Idaho at 658, 691 P.2d at 1273. Here,
11

because no objection was made, Denton must demonstrate fundamental error.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222-23, 228, 245 P.3d at 974-75, 980. Even if the record
supported clear misconduct, which it does not, Denton cannot show the
prosecutor's alleged disparagement of counsel affected the outcome of his trial.
According to Denton, the prosecutor's statements "cause[d] the jury to
disregard defense counsel's attacks on [Helena's] credibility because ... they
were improperly or inexpertly presented." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) But again,
the prosecutor's comments were not about counsel, they were about the
evidence. The prosecutor noted that defense counsel never asked Helena about
an inconsistency in her statement "because he didn't want her to say, that's not
what I said." (Vol. II Tr., p. 210, Ls. 23-24.) The prosecutor's argument is not
that defense counsel acted improperly or even inexpertly, but that the jury could
draw inferences from the omission of specific admissible evidence. The role of
the jury is to "determine the credibility of the witnesses [and] weigh the
evidence," State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260,263, 141 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Ct. App.
2006); the jury's role is not to judge the performances by counsel. As already
discussed, the court instructed the jury regarding their role. (See Vol. I, p. 168,
L. 15 - p. 169, L. 7.) We must presume the jury followed court's instruction and

did not disregard any evidence - whether for or against either party - based on
their perceptions of counsel's performance.
Given the record and applicable law, Denton has failed to establish clear
error or prejudice as to any of his assertions of prosecutorial misconduct.
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Accordingly, Denton has failed to show fundamental error, and his appeal must
be denied.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Denton's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 25th day of June, 2014.

~25
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of June, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

DJH/pm

13

